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APPREHENSION OF WAR CRIMES INDICTEES:
SHOULD THE UNITED NATIONS' COURTS
OUTSOURCE PRIVATE ACTORS TO CATCH
THEM?
Mary Alice Kovac+

The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented increase both in
international and intranational conflicts resulting in the commission of
egregious human rights violations, war crimes, and even genocide.1 To
date, the most notable international response to these continuing
atrocities is the United Nations (UN) Security Council's establishment of
ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 2 and Rwanda.3 However,

various nations continue to call for additional tribunals to try those
accused of similar crimes in Iraq,4 East Timor,5 Cambodia,6 and Sierra

+ J.D. Candidate, May 2002, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
1.
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 28 (1996) (attributing the increase in the intensity and

occurrence of dangerous conflicts to being "between peoples belonging to different
cultural entities").
See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 29, U.N. Doc. S/Res
2.
/827 (1993), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/827e.pdf (establishing the
International Tribunal for Yugoslavia "for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons
responsible for serious violations of international law").
See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
3.
(establishing the
(1994), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/944748e.htm
International Tribunal for Rwanda to accomplish the prosecution of "persons responsible
for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states").
See Jonathan Wright, U.S. Seeks Court for Iraqis Within Six Months, at
4.
http://www.my.aol.com/news /story.html#CYCLE (Aug. 2, 2000) (on file with author); see
also US. Urges a Tribunalfor Iraqi War Crimes, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2000, at A6 (citing
a Clinton administration official calling for Saddam Hussein to be tried for war crimes);
US. Senate Calls for War Crimes Trialfor Saddam Hussein, at http:// www. cnn. com/ US/
9801/13/senate.iraq.vote (Mar. 13, 1998) (reporting the vote as the result of frustration
over United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent agreement with Iraq over
weapons inspections); Dominic Evans, War Crimes Campaigners Target Iraqi Officials,
REUTERS, available at http://www.my.aol.com/news/ story/html#CYCLE (July 25, 2000)
(on file with author) (citing Ann Clwyd, a Labour Member of Parliament, as having

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 51:619

Leone.7 The need for a continuing forum to try such alleged criminals is
so apparent that for the first time in history, the establishment of a
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) has progressed beyond
theoretical speculation and is on its way to realization. s
Despite the clamor for such a forum, a continuing thorn in the side of
the tribunals, undermining both their credibility and the international
rule of law, is the inability to apprehend indictees so that they may stand
trial.9 The experience of the ad hoc tribunals0 illustrates how this

received sufficient documentary evidence to support the prosecution of five top Iraqis for
war crimes).
5.
See Asia-Pacific Timor Bishop Wants War Crimes Trial, BBC NEWS, BBC
ONLINE NETWORK, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/hi/ english/world/asia-pacific/newsid
492000/492266.stm (Oct. 28,1999) (describing Bishop Carlos Belos' call for a war crimes
trial and noting that it coincided with criticism by Amnesty International of the United
Nations for delaying investigations into alleged atrocities).
6.
See U.N. Endorses Tribunalfor Khmer Rouge War Crimes Trial, at http:// www.
cnn.comiWORLD/asiapcf/9903 /06/cambodia.01 (Mar. 6,1999). The United Nations chief
war crimes prosecutor, Louise Arbour, claims that because of the "involvement by high
level officials" in wide spread abuses, an international tribunal is necessary. Id.
7.
See Anthony Goodman, Mixed Court Proposedto Try S. Leone War Criminals,at
http://www.my.aol.com/news/story /html#CYCLE (July 27, 2000) (on file with author)
(reporting that U.S. ambassador Richard Holbrooke dismissed the ability of Sierra Leone
to establish its own court based on a 1999 amnesty law, claiming the need for an
international tribunal given that the "United Nations did not accept the amnesty under
international law").
8.
See Peter Charles Choharis, Wanted: A New Way to Judge the Crimes of War,
WASH. POST, July 23, 2000, at B4 (citing a need for the United States to be engaged in the
development of the ICC process); DAVID J. SCHEFFER, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR
WAR

CRIMES

ISSUES,

U.S.

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE,

PERSPECTIVES

ON

THE

ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE FIFTH ANNUAL
HAUSER LECTURE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Feb. 3,1999), available
at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/persp.htm (recounting his personal experience
with humanitarian crimes in Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Kuwait as demonstrating
the urgent need for codification of such crimes); Barbara Crossette, U.S. Gains a
Compromise on War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2000, at A6 (reporting efforts
of the United States' Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, David Scheffer, to make the
ICC more acceptable to domestic critics, stating that "[t]he international system simply
cannot continue to deal with these problems in an ad hoc manner indefinitely").
9.
See Yann Tessier, Interview-UN. Tribunal Chief Wants More War Crimes Arrests,
at http://www.my.aol.com/news/story. html#CYCLE (July 27, 2000) (on file with author)
(citing the shortcomings of the current system relying on cooperation of NATO countries
as the reason that the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia still has "too many people at
large").
10. See COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, ICT'Y Q&A (Jun. 4, 1999), at
http://www.icg.org/cij/ygeneral.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2000) (listing only twenty-six of
eighty-nine "publicly indicted" individuals as being in the custody of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia after five years).
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problem will plague the new ICC as well, to the continued detriment of
justice, reconciliation, and deterrence.1
The international court system needs an additional tool beyond those
it presently uses and acknowledges as legitimate in order to apprehend
effectively indicted war criminals. 12 When traditional means to
apprehend war crimes indictees have failed, it may be appropriate for the
international community, pursuant to the authority of the United
Nations as reposed in the appropriate tribunals (ad hoc or permanent),
to establish a rewards program for the apprehension of indictees by
private individuals."

This Comment reviews both international and domestic treatment of
extraterritorial abduction in the context of state sponsored action,
because indictees of war crimes will, for a variety of reasons, most often
act extraterritorially. Next, this Comment distinguishes the treatment of
extraterritorial abduction of ordinary criminals from alleged war
criminals. This Comment then examines exceptions for alleged terrorists
and how their legal bases might be extended to war crimes indictees.

Finally, this Comment summarizes problems inherent in other methods
of apprehension encountered by the ad hoc tribunals. This Comment
argues that an internationally sponsored rewards program for private
actors will assist the ICC in prosecuting its objectives by comparing and
11.

See CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO

OBLIGATIONS, OPTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 2-4 (1997), available at
http://www.udayton.edu/-cip/publications/boswar.htm (discussing the need for an effective
criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia in order to further justice for both victims and Yugoslavia
"by assigning specific guilt and thereby avoid[ing] collective guilt," deterring future
potential criminals, and "remov[ing] a key source of violence ... and in so doing ...
foster[ing] peace and the establishment of democracy"); see also David J. Scheffer,
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of State, Address at
Twelfth Annual U.S. Pacific Command International Military Operations and Law
Conference, Deterrence of War Crimes in the 21st Century, (Feb. 23, 1999), at
http://www.state.gov/www /policy-remarks/1999/ (addressing the work of the international
tribunals established for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and observing that "[n]othing would
serve deterrence better than the swift ... apprehension of those indictees who remain at
large" and that "[i]t is critical, for deterrence purposes, that these crimes enjoy ... no
weakening in the resolve of the international community to bring all indictees into
custody").
12 See UN. Prosecutor Frustratedthat Karadzic Still Free, at http:// www. my. aol.
com/news/story.html#CYCLE, (Aug. 22, 2000) (on file with author). Carla Del Ponte, the
chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal "was quoted.., as saying that she
was frustrated at the failure of NATO-led forces" to apprehend indicted war criminals. Id.
13. Cf Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International CriminalJustice in
the New Millennium: Lessons From the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 925,
JUSTICE:

949-51 (2000) (discussing the use of a rewards system for "arrest and conviction of indicted

war criminals" in the information context).
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analogizing the U.S. intranational bounty system and how it applies to
the proposed international program.
I. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW
Unlike national legal systems, there is no formal "code" of
international law proposed by a legislature, enforced by an executive,
and adjudicated by a judiciary. 4 Rather, international law "consists of
rules and principles of general application" between states and
international organizations derived from various sources.15 These
sources of
international law include international custom, treaties, and
16
case law.

A. InternationalCustom and Practice
Custom as a source for international law arises when there "is a clear
and continuous habit of doing certain actions which has grown up under
the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to
international law, obligatory or right."'" States' continuous "habit" or
practice may become a rule of customary international law, but only if
the states "follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation."' 8
As embodied in customary international law, the term "sovereignty"
describes the power of a state to exercise supreme legal authority over all
persons and activities within its borders, independent of any other
authority. 9 A state's activities within the borders of another state
14. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (4th ed. 1997) (advancing the
United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Security Council, and the
International Court of Justice as appearing to have some of the characteristics of a
legislature, an executive branch, and a judiciary and pointing out their individual
shortcomings when compared to a national system).
15. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 101 (1987); see also SHAW, supra note 14, at 55-56 (discussing the absence of
"hard and fast" sources and the disagreements of various writers regarding
categorization).
16. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 9, at 24 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 102; SHAW,
supra note 14, at 56-70.
17. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, § 10, at 27 (identifying
practice and opinio juris as the two essential elements of custom).
18. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 102; see also OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 16, § 10, at 27 (stating that a practice consists of "a clear and continuous
habit of doing certain actions which has grown up under the aegis of the conviction that
these actions are, according to international law, obligatory or right").
19. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, § 34, at 120-22 (requiring
that there indeed must be "a state" that contains a people, a defined territory, and a
government, and that this government must be sovereign, meaning a "legal authority
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without it,
typically require the host state's consent, and if conducted
S
20
such actions are violative of the host state's sovereignty. As a result,
customary international law generally proscribes extraterritorial
abduction by a state's law enforcement officers without the host state's
consent because such abduction infringes on the host state's
21
sovereignty.
Another important principle of customary international law influences
when states may exercise subject matter jurisdiction.22 The principle of
which is not in law dependent on any other earthly authority"); see also SHAW, supra note
14, at 143 (maintaining that the essential factor in determining whether a state actually
exists is independence).
20. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, § 119, at 385 (enunciating
the responsibility "correlative to the corresponding rights" of other states).
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 432(2) ("A state's law enforcement officers may
exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other
state, given by duly authorized officials of that state."); see also Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) ("Between independent States, respect for territorial
sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations."). But see OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, § 131, at 439 (introducing circumstances that may
justify intervention under international law). The authors stress that the actions taken
must be consistent
with the prohibition against the use or threat of force laid down in the United
Nations Charter ...proportional to the circumstances ... and other means of
remedying the situation (such as diplomatic representations) must be shown to
have failed or be so unlikely to succeed as to make recourse to them
unnecessary.
Id.

But see also

BENJAMIN B. FERENCz, 2 AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A

PEACE 96-97 (1980) (discussing the ultimate incongruity
between national sovereignty and prosecution of international crime). Professor Ferencz
states:
Although peoples are moving toward the acceptance of concerted action as a
matter of economic or military necessity, there are still wide divergencies in the
norms that regulate human behavior ... [t]here has not yet been sufficient
recognition that all values are relative and cannot be asserted in a vacuum.
Freedom of the press only becomes relevent [sic] after one has learned to read
and, as we know, freedom of speech has its limits in a crowded theater. So too
with national sovereignty - that most revered of foundation stones in the world
edifice. For States as well as for individuals the right of each must be limited by
the rights of others. States should not be free to exercise their sovereignty in
ways that ignore or violate the needs of the international community. Nations
cannot be allowed to create conditions where the only options are kill or be
killed. National needs must be subordinate to international needs. Any system
that allows the parties to interpret the law and do so as they see fit is unworthy of
respect because it is no system at all.
Id.
22. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, §§ 404, 423 (explaining that "[a] state has
jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the
community as of universal concern" and supporting the authority to exercise jurisdiction);
see also OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, § 139, at 469-70 (describing
STEP TOWARDS WORLD
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universality provides that a state may exercise jurisdiction over "certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern,
such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide,
war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism," even in the absence of
a connection between the state and the offense.-' In the absence of an
international criminal tribunal, 2' the punishment of such an offender is
usually left to the state that seizes the offender.2
The protective principle of jurisdiction also recognizes the rights of
states to punish some other limited offenses committed outside their
territory by persons who are not nationals. 26 These offenses typically
include those directed against a state's security, such as espionage,
counterfeiting, and conspiracy to violate immigration laws. 7
In recognition of a state's right to punish these crimes, the passive
personality principle, another customary international law principle,
recognizes that a nation may punish persons who are not its nationals
and who are outside its territory where the state has an especially strong

crimes that international law and the international community agree may be punished "by
whichever state has custody"); GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 222
(1991) (asserting that "[w]ar crimes and crimes against humanity ... would be known by
their perpetrators to be contrary to the general principles of law common to all nations,
acknowledging thereby their universal status").
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 404; see also JORDAN J. PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 405 (1996) (discussing the
universality principle and the enforcement obligation of states). Professor Paust states
that "[w]ith respect to war crimes in particular, there has been a long history of
expectation that war crimes are offenses against humankind over which there is universal
jurisdiction and a universal duty to prosecute" exists. Id.; see also SHAW, supra note 14, at
470-73 (describing a long-held consensus that war crimes and piracy "clearly belong"
under the umbrella of universal jurisdiction, but arguing that other crimes, as a result of
United Nations conventions and the actions of ad hoc tribunals, have now been added to
those covered by universal jurisdiction as well).
24. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status as of 2
October 2000, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statue/status.htm (stating that the treaty that
created the court and was intended to fulfill the function of an international tribunal has
been signed by 114 nations). However, only twenty-one countries have ratified the treaty.
Id. It will enter into force "after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession." Id.
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 404, at 255-57 (claiming the justification that the
crimes were against "all humanity").
26.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 402, at 240 (differentiating the protective
principle from the "diplomatic protection" principle of jurisdiction, which is defined as
"the right of a state to intercede on behalf of its nationals" through either diplomacy or
suit).
27. Id. (discussing these and other examples of crimes generally accepted as being
"directed against the security of the state or other offenses threatening the integrity of
governmental functions").
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interest in the crime. 28 This claim of jurisdiction applies to offenses
committed abroad that may affect the nationals of a state but occur
outside its territory.29
B. Treaties and Covenants Relevant to State Sovereignty and Individual
Human Rights
Customary international law is augmented by treaties, covenants, and
other international agreements. 3° As the keystone document in this
category,3 the UN Charter recognizes state sovereignty as the general
rule,32 but it specifically reserves the right of states to defend
themselves.33 Various regional agreements incorporate similar principles
However, the UN's
that protect the sovereignty of nations. 4
28. Id.
29. SHAW, supra note 14, at 467-68 (examining the United States' use of this claim of
jurisdiction, particularly in combatting terrorism).
30. See generally Paul C. Szasz, General Law-Making Progress, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-33 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) (identifying
treaties as "hard law" with the effect and obligation of a contract; while covenants are
characterized as instruments of "soft-law" and "international non-law," neither of which
can be considered binding, as they lack the obligatory language associated with treaties
and other international agreements); see also PAUST, supra note 23, at 3-4 (discussing the
UN conventions and codes as being considered by U.S. courts as sources augmenting
international law, as well as UN resolutions used by "U.S. courts as aids in identifying the
content of customary international law").
31. See Oscar Schachter, The UN Legal Order - An Overview, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW at 3-4 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) (asserting
that the UN system that has emerged from the Charter has resulted in the development of
"new law and legal regimes" that "have affected virtually every area of human life" and
interstate relations).
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (declaring that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations").
33. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The Charter states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
34. See, e.g., OAS CHARTER art. 17. The Organization of American States Charter
states:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State,
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or
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commitment to the principle of sovereignty has not always deterred it
from authorizing the violation of a member state's sovereignty to prevent
human rights abuses.35

The UN Charter also articulates concern for human rights. 36 Several
declarations and conventions have sought to codify certain human rights
that were originally expressed in the UN Charter.37 However, none of
the international human rights conventions to date prohibit abduction as
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall
be recognized.
Id.
35. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/940 (1994),
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/9431222e.htm (authorizing the member
states to "form a multinational force under unified command and control ... to use all
necessary means to facilitatethe departurefrom Haitiof the military leadership")(emphasis
added); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3930th mtg., 54th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1199 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/ sresl199.htm (calling
for a cease-fire in Kosovo, demanding that Yugoslavia cease all hostilities there, and
demanding that Yugoslavia implement the measures recommended by the Contact Group
- the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom
(including the deployment of a European Community Monitoring mission) - to "resolve
existing problems"); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1203 (1998), available at http:// www. un.org/ Docs/scres/ 1998/ sres1203 .htm
(demanding that Yugoslavia take immediate action to avert an impending "humanitarian
catastrophe," and approving the deployment of the European Community Observation
mission); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres /1999/99sc1244.htm (demanding the
withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serb forces and authorizing "Member States... to establish.
• . [an] international security presence" in Kosovo); NATO's Role in Relation to the
Conflict in Kosovo: Historical Overview, (updated Jul. 15, 1999), at http:// www. nato.
int/kosovo /history.htm (describing Operation Allied Force and its associated bombing of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as required in order to enforce UN Security Council
resolutions); Bogdan Denitch & Ian Williams, The Case Against Inaction (Apr. 26, 1999),
at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ issues/kosovo4l.htm (lamenting the absence of a
Security Council Resolution specifically endorsing military action, but reporting the
overwhelming failure of a Russian draft resolution condemning the bombing as proof that
"the court of international public opinion has implicitly, resoundingly, endorsed military
action") (emphasis added); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-6 (1999), availableat http://www.ejil org/journal/ VollO/
Nol/abl.html (last modified Apr. 26, 1999) (arguing that the right of a state to intervene
militarily to permit humanitarian intervention "deserve[s] a friendlier reaction" under
international law).
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1 (stating that the UN will "assist[ ] in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms"); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 55
(demonstrating that the UN is self-tasked to promote "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights").
37. See Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 137-38 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) (assessing the process as
intended to result in "the adoption of legally binding human rights norms" and stating that
some of the principles set forth in this manner have indeed "ripened into customary
international law, binding on all states").
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a violation of international human rights law.38 Despite the absence of
explicit prohibitions, certain sections might be invoked to support such a
view."

Of the treaties that form the basis of international law, extradition
treaties are the most relevant to this article."' Extradition treaties are the
usual legal mechanism used to transfer alleged criminals between states.41

Disputes regarding extraterritorial abduction typically arise in the
absence or disregard of such treaties. 42
C. InternationalCourts and Tribunals

Unlike sovereign nations, which in most cases have established legal
systems to enforce laws, international law lacks a court with "general,
comprehensive and compulsory jurisdiction."43

There are, however,

international courts and tribunals with a more limited jurisdiction and
authority that resolve certain conflicts between governments and that
periodically hold war criminals individually accountable for their
crimes. 4'
38. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 432 note 1, at 330 (stating that "[n]one of the
international human rights conventions to date . . . provides that forcible abduction or
irregular extradition are violations of international human rights law").
39. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art.
9(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,175 (prohibiting "arbitrary arrest or detention"); see also Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 15, § 432 note 1, at 330 (stating that "Articles 3, 5, and 9 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Articles 7, 9 and 10 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights might be invoked in support" of the view that forcible
abduction is prohibited under international human rights law).
40. GILBERT, supra note 22, at 20 (identifying bilateral treaties "as the first method
to be used to conclude extradition relations").
41. Id. at 17 (identifying the "principle of reciprocity" as being that in which each
state agrees that similar actions will meet with similar responses in corresponding
situations).
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, at § 432 note 3, at 331-32 (indicating the
circumstances under which conflicts have arisen between states).
43. See id. at 17 (discussing the International Court of Justice as deciding only cases
submitted voluntarily to it and its other functions being restricted to "render[ing] advisory
opinions"); see also Christopher C. Joyner, Conclusion: The United Nations as
International Law Giver, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 436-37
(Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) (discussing the limited number of cases reviewed by the
International Court of Justice, averaging two per year since its creation, and the reluctance
of states to bring matters to the court, preferring "[p]ersistent political stalemate" to the
possibility of losing a case before the court); SHAW, supra note 14, at 754 (explaining that
private individuals have no standing before the International Court of Justice).
44. See generally SHAW, supra note 14, at 37-39 (assessing the Nuremberg and Tokyo
War Crimes Tribunals as recognizing "individual responsibility under international law
without the usual interposition of the state") (emphasis added); see also Joyner, supra note
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The International Court of Justice was established at The Hague
pursuant to the UN Charter to adjudicate disputes between nations.
Several ad hoc tribunals have been established for limited periods to try
accused war criminals, including Nuremberg4 6 and Tokyo4 7 after
World
4
War II, as well as Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the last ten years. 1
Additionally, the new ICC will provide a permanent forum to try
individuals accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.49 Unlike other international courts to date, the ICC is based
on the principle of complementarity; that is, generally, national courts
will have the first option to try such indictees within their jurisdiction. °
The ICC exerts jurisdiction over an individual only when the requisite

43, at 437-38 (discussing the Rwanda and Yugoslavia International Criminal Tribunals and
asserting that, despite their limited jurisdiction, both will establish significant precedents
for the formation of the ICC).
45. International Court of Justice Statute, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, U.N.T.S. 993.
46. Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis [London Agreement], Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. 472 (asserting
jurisdiction to prosecute "major war criminals" of the "European Axis" powers for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace).
47. Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (asserting jurisdiction over "persons charged
individually, or as members of organizations, or in both capacities, with offenses which
include crimes against peace"); see also 2 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL xxiilviii (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998) (discussing the background and development of the
tribunal and the impact of international politics on its activities).
48. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 2, at 29; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, at 15.
49. Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, The United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
at Rome, 9th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9th [as corrected by the procrs - verbaux of
10 November 1.998 and 12 July 1999] (1999), available at http://www.un.org/law/ icc/
statute/99_corr/1.htm; see also Setting the Record Straight: The International Criminal
Court, available at http://www.un.org/News/facts/iccfact.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2000)
(describing crimes covered by the ICC):
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity, such as widespread or systematic extermination of civilians,
enslavement, torture, rape, forced pregnancy, persecution on political, racial,
ethnic or religious grounds, and enforced disappearances. The Court's Statute
lists and defines all these crimes to avoid ambiguity.
Id.
50. 3 J. OPPENHEIM & W. VAN DER WOLF, WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN FUTURE 58
(2000) (claiming that the ICC is not intended to replace the jurisdiction of functioning
national judicial systems).
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national court refuses to try the individual, chooses to transfer him to the
ICC, or conducts a sham trial.51
The problem of physical apprehension of such indictees is a critical

factor negatively affecting both the current effectiveness of the ad hoc
tribunals and the potential efficacy of the ICC.52 As the number of such
indictments via the ad hoc tribunals has increased, the tools currently
available to the international community to apprehend indictees in the
face of custodial states' refusal to cooperate have often proved
insufficient. 3 The inefficacy has resulted in many indictees remaining at
large for protracted periods of time. 4
51. Rome Statute, supra note 49, at art. 17. The Statute states:
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall
determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the
investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a state which has jurisdiction over it and
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject
of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20,
paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
2. In order to determine the unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall
consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article
5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider
whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
Id.
52. Scheffer, supra note 11 (discussing universal jurisdiction of the ICC and
concluding that "[w]ithout custody.. . a ... claim of universal jurisdiction necessarily and
rightly is limited").
53. BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE, supra note 11, at iv (discussing the fact
that sixty-seven indicted war criminals have been permitted by NATO inaction to roam
free asserting that "[t]he time has come to arrest and apprehend these individuals," and
summarizing fifty recommendations to accomplish the International Criminal Tribunal for
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D. InternationalCase Law

The Permanent Court of International Justice, the predecessor to the
International Court of Justice, stated in S.S. Lotus55 that "there is no rule
of international law which prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction

over a foreigner in respect of an offense committed outside its
territory."56 The court found that international law did not prohibit
states from extending "the application of their laws and the jurisdiction
of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory ....

The territoriality of criminal law, therefore, is not an absolute principle
of international law and by no means coincides with territorial

sovereignty. 5 7 Although the judgment of the court is met with lingering
criticism, it is an important precedent that highlights the continuing
controversy regarding the legal status of a state's exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 8
In 1949, the International Court of Justice ruled on a dispute between
the United Kingdom and Albania. The dispute arose when mines laid in
Albanian waters in the North Corfu Channel damaged two British ships,
killing several British crew members. 9 The court found in Corfu
Channel that the British ships did not violate Albania's territorial

sovereignty because their passage through the strait was for the purpose
of innocent navigation.6" Although the court found that Britain's
subsequent minesweeping operation did violate Albania's sovereignty
because it was conducted without Albania's consent, the court
nevertheless held Albania monetarily responsible for the damages
Britain incurred because Albania had failed to warn of the hazard, as
Yugoslavia mandate); see also GILBERT, supra note 22, at 222 (concluding that the right of
Israel to prosecute Nazi war criminals, despite questions about Israeli court neutrality, is
necessary when "the state with territorial jurisdiction refuses to prosecute").
54.
BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS To JUSTICE, supra note 11, at iv; see also GILBERT,
supranote 22, at 222.
55. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
56. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, § 139, at 468 (clarifying that
even states that maintain an "almost exclusively territorial approach to criminal
jurisdiction" extend jurisdiction to include offenses committed by non-nationals outside of
their sovereign borders in certain cases).
57. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 35-36 (Sept. 7).
58. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 16, § 140 at 478-79; see also
GILBERT, supra note 22, at 222 (discussing the dissenting opinion of Judge Moore in Lotus
Steamship as not applicable in cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and that
his "strictures are not determinative in these circumstances").
59. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9) (Merits).
60. Id. at 30-32 (asserting that the intent of Great Britain, which was indeed to test
Albania's response, was not relevant to the determination that the channel was open to all
navigation).

2002]

Apprehension of War Crimes Indictees

required by international law.61 However, the only penalty the court
imposed on Britain, regarding the minesweeping operation, was the
judgment itself, which found a violation of Albania's territorial
sovereignty.62
The abduction of Adolf Eichmann, an alleged war criminal, is the most
notable incident involving an infringement of a state's territorial
sovereignty resulting from the use of this extraterritorial apprehension
method.63 On May 11, 1960, Israeli agents, or "volunteers," abducted
Adolf Eichmann from his home in Argentina and took him to Israel to
stand trial for crimes committed in Germany during the Holocaust. 64 The
Argentinian government protested that Israel's action violated
Argentina's territorial sovereignty, demanded Eichmann's return, and
requested punishment of the individuals responsible for violating
Argentinian law.65 Israel apologized but refused to return Eichmann to
Argentina. 66 Argentina then filed a complaint with the Security Council
of the United Nations that alleged the violation of its territorial
byemaned
Israel via its exercise
sovereignty
terrtoryand
•
67 of authority within Argentinian
territory and demanded reparation. The UN Security Council passed a
resolution that expressed disapproval of Israel's action, but it did not
require Eichmann's return.6 Israel subsequently tried, convicted, and
executed Eichmann. 69

61. Id. at 23 (stating that notifying all inbound shipping, as well as all nations, of the
hazard caused by the mining was a more important responsibility).
62. Id. at 36 (holding that "the United Kingdom violated the sovereignty of the
People's Republic of Albania, and that this declaration by the Court constitutes in itself
appropriatesatisfaction") (emphasis added).
63. Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961),
affd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962).
64. Id. at 57-59 (explaining that the defense claimed that the abductors were "agents
of the State of Israel" and that the prosecutor avoided the characterization).
65. Id. at 5-6 (asserting Israeli approval as proof of Israeli State responsibility).
66. Id. at 6 (stating that Prime Minister Ben Gurion's letter expressed regret over the
violation of sovereignty but referred to higher motives and historical reasons for not
returning Eichmann).
67. Id.
68. 1960 U.N.Y.B. 196, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). Security Council Resolution 196
states:
The Security Council,
Having examined the complaint that the transfer of Adolf Eichmann to the
territory of Israel constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the Argentine
Republic,
Considering that the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is
incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations,
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The French case Re: Argoud' demonstrates that extraterritorial
abduction has not been restricted to the state of Israel.71 In 1961,
pursuant to a French arrest warrant, a French citizen named Antoine
Argoud was abducted from Munich by unknown persons and taken to
Paris.7 French police then found and arrested him after an anonymous
telephone call informed them of his location. 73 Argoud argued on appeal
of his conviction to the Court of Cassation (a criminal appeals court) that
the Court of State Security lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to
the irregular method used to procure his arrest.74 The Court of Cassation
denied his appeal and pronounced the lower court's jurisdiction sound. 75

Having regard to the fact that reciprocal respect for and the mutual protection of
the sovereign rights of States are an essential condition for their harmonious
coexistence,
Noting that the repetition of acts such as that giving rise to this situation would
involve a breach of the principles upon which international order is founded
creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the
preservation of peace,
Mindful of the universal condemnation of the persecution of the Jews under the
Nazis and of the concern of people in all countries that Eichmann should be
brought to appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is accused,
Noting at the same time that this resolution should in no way be interpreted as
condoning the odious crimes of which Eichmann is accused,
1. Declares that acts such as that under consideration, which affect the
sovereignty of a Member State and therefore cause international friction, may, if
repeated, endanger international peace and security;
2. Requests the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international
law;
3. Expresses the hope that the traditionally friendly relations between Argentina
and Israel will be advanced.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
69. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 342.
70. 45 I.L.R. 90 (Ct. of Cass. 1964).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 590 U.S. 655 (1992); see also Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Beahan v. State, 103 I.L.R. 203
(Zimb. Sup. Ct. 1991); Ndhlovu & Another v. Minister of Justice & Others, 68 I.L.R. 7 (S.
Afr., Natal Provincial Division 1976).
72. Argoud, 45 I.L.R. at 90 (stating that Argoud was found by police, based on
information received in the anonymous telephone call, in a van parked in Paris,
handcuffed and showing signs of mistreatment).
73. Id. at 98 (characterizing the forcible nature of his seizure, in the absence of
extradition proceedings, as warranting relief).
74. Id. at 92 (requesting that the court return Argoud to the Federal Republic of
Germany).
75. Id. at 90 (holding that the abduction, although perhaps a violation of sovereignty,
did not invalidate Argoud's prosecution).
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Another example of extraterritorial abduction occurred in South
Africa in 1976, in Ndhlovu & Another v. Minister of Justice & Others.76
South African police arrested two South African citizens living in the7
Kingdom of Swaziland, where they had been granted political asylum.
The South African citizens appealed for their return to Swaziland on the

grounds that their arrest violated Swaziland sovereignty.
African Natal Provincial Division Court held that it had jurisdiction to

law for an
try persons "arrested in violation of public international
offence committed against the laws of that State." 79
II. UNITED STATES LAW
A. ExtraterritorialAbduction Case Law

Although various nations engage in extraterritorial abduction as
discussed above, the United States has one of the longest lines of case
law in this area."' These cases assert jurisdiction regardless of the method

used to apprehend suspects and also proclaim the right to seize suspects
extraterritorially in certain cases regardless of international custom.81
One such case, Ker v. Illinois,"' arose when Frederick M. Ker, a U.S.
citizen wanted for larceny and embezzlement in Illinois, 83 was kidnapped84

from Lima, Peru, by Henry G. Julian and brought to the United States.

Although there was an extradition treaty between the United States and
Peru,8 Mr. Julian failed to present the extradition request to the

76. 68 I.L.R. 7 (S. Afr., Natal Provincial Division 1976).
77. Id. at 8 (stating that the applicants were granted political asylum in the 1960s).
78. Id. (requesting that the South African citizens "be returned, or be permitted to
return" and that the criminal proceedings be dropped or withdrawn until a proper
extradition from Swaziland could be effected).
79. Id. at 13-14.
80. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 411 n.22 (1986).
81.
Id. at 411 (maintaining that "[t]he United States... still allows unlawful seizures
of persons to be valid ... and does not disqualify different forms of disguised extradition
and fraudulent or forceful means" contrary to the "modern view" of international law).
82. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
83. Id. at 437. His actual route took Ker from Peru to Hawaii by steamship, and then
via a second steamship voyage from Hawaii to California. Id. at 438. Ker was transferred
from California to Illinois via an extradition petition from the Governor of Illinois and the
extradition was so ordered by the Governor of California. Id.
84. Id. at 438, 442-43 (citing the fact that the extradition treaty would not have
imparted any rights to Ker as he had not formally sought asylum in Peru following his
flight there).
85. Extradition Convention between Peru and the United States, Sept. 12, 1870, art
II, 18 Stat. 719-21 (listing both larceny and embezzlement as extraditable crimes); see also
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Peruvian authorities and acted without authority to apprehend and
remove Mr. Ker, who was then subsequently extradited to Illinois and
tried. 86 When Ker appealed based on his irregular apprehension, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that the illegal apprehension did not
render his subsequent trial and conviction invalid."'
Sixty-six years after Ker, in Frisbie v. Collins,""the U.S. Supreme Court
reinforced the Supreme Court of Illinois when it held that "forcible
abduction" from one state to another in violation of the Federal
Kidnapping Act did not vitiate a subsequent conviction in the second
state on the grounds of lack of due process. 89 The holdings from Ker and
Frisbie became known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and this doctrine
established that extraterritorial abduction does not negate an American
court's jurisdiction over a defendant.'o
Although the Supreme Court established the suppression doctrine in
Weeks v. United States,9 which provides that evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment may not be used at trial,2 the Court has
repeatedly refused to extend the doctrine to people who have been
illegally seized. 93 Thus, the illegal apprehension of individuals by
142 THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 40 n.a (1977) (noting that the
"treaty was terminated March 31, 1886, on notice given by Peru").
86. Ker v. Illinios, 119 U.S. 436, 441-42; see also Ker v. Illinois, 110 Ill. 627 (1884)
(reporting that the Secretary of State had provided a copy of the warrant to the U.S.
Counsel in Peru "to procure the executive of Peru to surrender [the] defendant" to
Julian). Id. at 635. However, the Counsel was never contacted by Julian during his time in
Lima. Id.
87. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442-45 (commenting on the appeal in general, the Court
characterized the proposition that Ker should be released based on his claim of violation
of asylum as absurd).
88. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
89. See id. at 522-23 (asserting that "[t]his court has never departed from the rule
announced in Ker... that the power of a court to try a person for [a] crime is not impaired
by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible
abduction' and that no additional "persuasive reasons" had been raised in Frisbie's
appeal to warrant a change).
90. Perry John Seaman, International Bountyhunting:
A Question of State
Responsibility, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 397, 407-08 (1985) (stating that the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine "provides that the forcible and unlawful abduction of a criminal defendant will
not impair the court's jurisdiction over that defendant").
91. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
92. Id. at 386-89. Weeks appealed his conviction on a violation of the use of the mails
by transporting lottery tickets, as the tickets had been illegally seized during an
unwarranted search. Id. at 386.
93. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (declining to "retreat from the
established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction");
see also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (holding an illegally arrested
defendant "is not himself a suppressible 'fruit,' and the illegality of his detention cannot
CLIVE PARRY,

2002]

Apprehension of War Crimes Indictees

abduction, whether intra- or international, does not result in suppression
of the individual's person at trial. 94
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals established the outer limit of the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine in United States v. Toscanino9' In this case, the
Second Circuit held that, if proven, U.S. government-sponsored torture
of a foreign national who was kidnapped from Uruguay and
subsequently convicted in the United States would extraterritorially
violate the due process of a foreign national." The Toscanino holding
marks the first substantive limitation of the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine because
a federal court had not previously allowed rehearings in cases of
apprehension by abduction for any reason.
Despite its extension of due process protections in Toscanino to abuses
that "shock the conscience," 98 the U.S. Supreme Court effectively
reinforced the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine in United States v. Alvarez-Machain.99
In this case, a Mexican doctor was abducted from Mexico and taken to
Texas for his participation in the torture and murder of a Drug
Enforcement Administration agent and his pilot.1l° Despite the existence
of an extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States, the Court
held that the treaty did not explicitly prohibit international abductions,
and that the district court had jurisdiction to try the Mexican national,
even though he had been forcibly abducted and brought to the United
States. 1

deprive the Government of the opportunity to prove his guilt through the introduction of
evidence wholly untainted by the police misconduct").
94. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119; see also Crews, 445 U.S. at 472-73.
95. 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974).
96. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276 (asserting that, if true, government misconduct
"would, as a matter of due process" warrant Toscanino some unspecified relief).
97. Id. at 281 (remanding the case to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing and
requiring Toscanino to offer "credible supporting evidence" to support the allegation that
the torture occurred "by or at the direction of United States officials"); see also United
States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying the dismissal, as
Toscanino was unable to demonstrate United States governmental participation in either
the abduction or the subsequent torture).
98. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272-73 (alleging Toscanino's torture to have included
beatings, sleep deprivation, denial of food and water, electric shock and repeated
harassment).
99. 504 U.S. 655, 662-63, 670 (1992).
100. Id. at 657 (stating the Drug Enforcement Agency's belief that Alvarez-Machain
had taken direct actions to prolong the life of a DEA agent, Enrique Camarena-Salazar,
for the sole purpose of permitting Camarena to be tortured and interrogated).
101. Id. at 688-70; see also Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1996) (recounting the acquittal of Alvarez-Machain on charges related to the
Camarena-Salazar murder, in this suit brought against the United States and the DEA
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Applying the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to an international abduction by
American law enforcement agents in 1985, the U.S. government
conducted its first overseas arrest of a suspected terrorist wanted for
violations of U.S. laws. " " Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese man wanted for the
1985 taking of U.S. hostages, as well as the hijacking and explosive
destruction of a Jordanian airliner in Beirut, "3 was apprehended in
international waters of the Mediterranean after being lured aboard a
yacht by U.S. agents under the pretense of making a drug sale.'
Yunis was subsequently convicted in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia" 5 On appeal, the District of Columbia
Circuit held, in United States v. Yunis, that international law could not
preclude exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant."" The
appellate court also held that the universality principle of international
law,"' under which states may prescribe and prosecute certain offenses
recognized by the international community as meriting universal
concern,10 established subject matter jurisdiction over Yunis' offenses.""
The court found no evidence of the sort of "intentional, outrageous
government conduct necessary"'" to sustain Yunis' jurisdictional
argument under the "very limited exception to the general rule""' from
Toscanino.

agents who abducted him, alleging civil rights violations, Federal Tort Claims Act claims,
and violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act).
102. Seth Kantor, Sting by FBI Nabs Suspect in '85 Hijack: Lebanese Man Arrested on
MediterraneanBoat, ATLANTA J. CONSTITUTION, Sept. 18, 1987, at Al.
103. Id. (statement by Attorney General Edwin Meese) (alleging that Yunis was the
spokesman for "five Shiite Moslem [sic] terrorists" who seized a Royal Jordanian Airlines
passenger aircraft and its sixty-five passengers, including four Americans).
104. Id. (describing Yunis as "voluntarily board[ing] a boat being operated ... by
disguised FBI agents" in an apparent "sting").
105. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reporting the result
of the district court trial of Yunis as "convicted ... of conspiracy, aircraft piracy and
hostage taking").
106. Id. at 1090-91 (concluding that the intent of Congress and treaty obligations of the
United States could permit no other determination).
107. Id. at 1091 (appealing the jurisdiction of the United States relying on
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§

404 & 423 (1987), a position vehemently rejected by the Court).
108. Id.
109. Id. (claiming the crime itself, "even absent any special connection between the
state and the offense," as being sufficient for jurisdiction).
110. Id. at 1093 (admitting that the actions of government agents in the arrest of Yunis
may not have been "'picture perfect' nor 'a model for law enforcement behavior').
111. Id. at 1092 (specifically reinforcing the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine).
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Most recently, the Supreme Court again endorsed the Ker-Frisbie
appeal"12
doctrine when it rejected, without comment, Mir Aimal Kasi's
that his arrest by FBI agents in Pakistan violated the Fourth
Amendment's ban on unreasonable seizures."' Kasi was arrested, tried,
and sentenced to death for the 1993 shootings of two federal workers
outside CIA headquarters.11 " Speculation persists that Kasi was actually
apprehended in Afghanistan by either U.S. or Pakistani agents who then
transported him across the border into Pakistan where the arrest was
officially made by U.S. agents, after which, he was flown to the United
States. " 5
B. A Brief Overview of the US. Bounty System
Bounty hunters have become an integral part of the American pretrial
process."16 Once most criminal defendants are arraigned, they hire a bail
bondsman who posts bail with the court in order for them to be released
from jail pending trial."7 Once the bondsman posts bail, the state
delivers legal custody of the defendant to the bondsman, who then has
of arrest as a police officer concerning the
roughly the same powers
8
defendant."1
particular
If the defendant "jumps bail," thereby potentially forfeiting the
bondsman's posted bail, the bondsman's broad powers of arrest may be
conferred by the bondsman to a bounty hunter, who may act as the
bondsman's agent and recapture the defendant." 9 Because bounty
hunters have typically been deemed private rather than state actors,

112. Kasi v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999).
113. Allen Lengel, Craig Timberg, Ruben Castaneda, & Associated Press, Justice and
Crime, WASH. POST, June 25, 1999, at B2.
114. Id.; see also Kasi v. Virginia, 508 S.E.2d 57, 68 (Va. 1998) (holding that the death
penalty was "properly assessed" in Kasi's case).
115. Thomas W. Lippman, Two Governments Cloak Details of the Capture, WASH.
POST, June 19, 1997, at A10 (explaining the political and legal dynamics that may have
motivated both the U.S. and Pakistani governments to not publicize their roles in the
capture). The author asserts that "[j]udging from the public pronouncements of U.S.
officials yesterday ... the capture of CIA shooting suspect Mir Aimal Kansi [sic] did not
occur in any particular place. It just happened in disembodied space somewhere." Id.
116. Jonathan Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of Bounty
Hunters in The American CriminalJustice System, 33 Hous. L. REv. 731,735 (1996).
117. Id. at 740 (describing bail as "a more practical justification [ ]to avoid inflicting...
a jail sentence on a person... presum[ed] innocent").
11& Id. at 736 (defining these powers as both search and arrest).
119. Id. at 743 (explaining that the bond will only be refunded if the defendant makes
his court appearance).
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constitutional protections do not apply to their actions,120 although some
commentators have suggested government regulation.121
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR YUGOSLAVIA
CONFRONTS THE ISSUE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION

The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia has begun to
l
indict and prosecute war criminals from the former Yugoslavia. 2
Several of the cases, however, have raised the issue of jurisdiction based
upon allegations of extraterritorial abduction.' 3
Slavko Dokmanovic first raised the defense of illegal apprehension in
2
Prosecutorv. Mrkgic, Radic, 9ljivancanin & Dokmanovic.1
' UN forces

arrested Dokmanovic in 1997, in Croatia, pursuant to his indictment for
charges related to killing unarmed civilians.' He had previously fled to
Serbia, where he was allegedly lured back to Croatia and into the custody
of waiting UN soldiers."' In a pretrial motion for release, Dokmanovic
120. Id. at 739 (asserting that "[c]ourts generally have held that their powers do not
make them state actors") (emphasis added).
121. See generally Gregory Townsend, State Responsibilityfor Acts of de facto Agents,
14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 635 (1997) (discussing the activities of de facto agents in
association with international tribunals); see also Drimmer, supra note 116, at 778-793
(urging the need for regulation of bounty hunters in the U.S. court system for the
protection of the population).
122. ICFY Q&A, supra note 10 (summarizing the arrests and convictions to date).
123. UN Wire, Bosnia: Capture of War Crimes Suspect Could be Ruled Illegal, United
Nations Foundation, Aug. 18, 2000, available at http://www.unfoundation.org/ unwire/
archives[UNWIRE000818.cfm (discussing the claims of Deyan Rankon Brashich, defense
attorney to indicted war criminal Stevan Todorovic, that the arrest of his client "broke
international law" and that Todorovic "should be returned to Serbia, adding that 'a
defendant who has been unlawfully abducted must be returned to the place of
abduction'); see also Serb Court Charges Abductors of War Crimes Suspect, REUTERS,
Aug. 24, 2000, available at http://www.my.aol.com/news/story/html#CYCLE (on file with
author) (describing a Serbian regional court's accusations charging seven Serbian civilian
men with the abduction of war crimes indictees Stevan Todorovic and Dragan Nikolic in
collusion with NATO's SFOR troops).
124. Prosecutor v. Mrk~ic, Radic, 9ljivancanin & Dokmanovic, Ill I.L.R. 458, 461
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 1997) (Decision on the Motion for Release by
the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic) (finding that the method of arrest, the use of a ruse to
persuade Dokmanovic to enter a vehicle which then transported him to an area of Croatia
under United Nations control, was not equivalent to a "forcible abduction or
kidnapping"); see also Prosecutor v. Mrkgic, Radic, 9ljivancanin and Dokmanovic (July 15,
1998), (Order Terminating Proceedings Against Slavko Dokmanovic) available at
http://www.un.org/icty/dokmanovic/ trialc2/order-e/80715MS2.htm (reporting that charges
were dropped as a result of Dokmanovic's suicide at The Hague before any appeal could
be made on the court's determination that Dokmanovic's arrest had not violated
international law).
125. Mrkic, 111 I.L.R. at 462.
126. Id. at 467-68.
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argued that the circumstances of his arrest, which he claimed were
tantamount to kidnapping, were illegal violations of Serbian sovereignty
and international law. 127 The court found Dokmanovic's motion on this
basis meritless.' Dokmanovic subsequently committed suicide in prison
and therefore scholars can only speculate on the outcome of further
appeals. 29
Another indictee, Stevan Todorovic, raised similar questions, which
the court seriously considered in Prosecutor v. Simic. 3° Todorovic was
indicted for the murder and rape of Croatian and Muslim civilians in
Bosnia"' and alleged that a British Special Air Service team seized him
from Serbia. 3 2 The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugogslavia
Trial Chamber III had decided to support Todorovic's request for
judicial assistance, directing NATO and NATO's Stabilization Force
(SFOR) to provide "documents, items and material" relating to his
arrest."' However, a subsequent plea bargain resulting in Todorovic
pleading guilty to one out of the twenty-seven counts against him
The plea agreement required Todorovic to
preempted the issue.'
withdraw all motions pending before the Trial Chamber "in which the
accused sought an evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of his

127. Id. at 469 (arguing that he "was arrested in a 'tricky way' which can only be
interpreted as 'kidnapping').
12& Id. at 471-74 (finding that the method of arrest, use of a ruse to encourage
Dokmanovic to enter a vehicle which took him into an area of Croatia under United
Nations control, was not equivalent to a "forcible abduction or kidnapping").
129. Mrkfic Order, supra note 124 (reporting that charges were dropped as a result of
his suicide).
130. No. IT-95-9 (ICTY 1995) (pending) available at http://www.un. org/icty/ind-e.htm
(last visited Sept. 28, 2000).
131. ICTY Q&A, supra note 10.
132. Tom Walker, SAS CarriedOut Serb Raid, TIMES (London), Nov. 11, 1998, at 15,
available at http: H www. bosnet. org / archive/ bosnet. w3archive/ 9811 / msgOO030.html
(reporting Todorovic's allegations that he was seized from a cabin fifty miles from the
border, transported to Bosnia, and turned over to U.S. personnel).
133. Press Release, The Hague, Decision on Todorovic's Motion for Judicial
Assistance (Oct. 20, 2000), XT/P.I.S./536-e, available at http://www. un.org /icty / pressreal/
p536-e.htm (directing that all information related to the events surrounding Todorovic's
arrest and transport be provided to the defense and describing issuance of a subpoena for
relevant testimony and evidence from the current U.S. Army Chief of Staff and former
commander of SFOR, General Shinseki, "as an individual with personal knowledge of the
events of which the complaint is made").
134. Press Release, The Hague, Plea Agreement Announced at Motion Hearing in
Todorovic Case, (Dec. 13, 2000), JLUP.I.S./549-e, available at http://www.un.org/icty/
pressreal/ p549-e.htm.
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arrest. "' 5 Although the court provided no direct rationale to justify the
plea bargain, Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt admitted that
Todorovic's ongoing appeal had resulted in a decline in arrests preceding
the plea agreement.' 6 Todorovic was ultimately
sentenced to ten years
37
in prison on one count of "persecution.'
The case of Dragan Nikolic, indicted in Prosecutor v. Nikolic, is
pending.' 38 Nikolic is accused of murder and other "crimes against
humanity" while running a detention camp in Bosnia.'39
The
circumstances surrounding Nikolic's apprehension are allegedly similar
to those of Todorovic; however, similar appeals have not yet been filed
because the Nikolic case is still in preliminary stages. 40
IV. STATE PRACTICE IS EXTRATERRITORIAL ABDUCTION IN
VIOLATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN CERTAIN CASES

Having reviewed merely a sampling of the international case law, it
may be credibly argued that customary international law has evolved to
incorporate an exception to the general prohibition against
extraterritorial abduction as a violation of sovereignty for war criminals,
terrorists, and others who pose a threat to either a particular nation's or
the international community's peace and security."4' Although many
commentators insist that the prohibition against extraterritorial
abduction in international law is absolute in all circumstances,' 2 state

135. Prosecutor v. Simic, Order Separating Proceedings and Scheduling Order, 24
January 2001, Trial Chamber, available at http://www.un.org/icty/todorovic/trialc/ ordere/10124ST514897.htm.
136. ICTY Weekly Press Briefing, Dec. 13, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/
icty/briefing/PBl31200.htm.
137. Prosecutor v. Todorovic, July 31, 2001, available at http://www.un.org/icty/
todorovic/judgement/tod-tj0731e.htm.
138. No. IT-94-2 (pending), available at http://www.un. org/icty/ind-e.htm (last visited
Sept. 28, 2000).
139. Press Release, The Hague, Initial Appearance of Dragan Nikolic on Friday 28
April 2000, (Apr. 26, 2000), CC/P.I.S./496-E, available at http://www.un.orglicty/
pressreal/p496-e/htm (reporting that the indictment of Nikolic was "the first ever
application of Rule 61").
140. Serb Court Charges Abductors, supranote 123.
141. See generally Beverly Izes, Drawing Lines in the Sand: When State-Sanctioned
Abductions of War Criminals Should be Permitted, 31 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 37
(1997) (concluding that "[t]here is an urgent need for ... ratification of rules governing
state-sanctioned abductions").
142. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER, 123 (1974) (while asserting that international abduction is a "flagrant violation of
...human rights.., and subvert[s] the international process," he admits that there is no
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practice, and the fact that consequences for such violations are negligible
or non-existent, make an absolutist stance in this regard less than
convincing, especially in the types of cases pertinent to this article.143
When an extraterritorial abduction violates a state's sovereignty and
the state does not complain, there is no consequence for the state that
committed the violation.IM The experiences of South Africa, France, and
the United States in traditional criminal cases that 1laid
45 the foundation for
premise.
this
exemplify
applications
germane
more
When South African police violated Swaziland's sovereignty to
apprehend South African citizens in Ndhlovu, 46 Swaziland did not
officially complain about South Africa's action, and the defendants were
successfully prosecuted by the South African court. 47 Moreover, the
South African court cited Ker and Frisbie as persuasive authority in
asserting their jurisdiction in spite of the method of apprehension.
In
Argoud, Germany did not request Argoud's return despite the fact that
he was clearly kidnapped from Munich and subsequently prosecuted and
convicted in a French court. 49 In Ker, Peru did not protest the
kidnapping of an American citizen from its territory in violation of an
extradition treaty between the two countries, and Ker was also
successfully prosecuted.'
The holdings of these cases epitomize the
deterrent to such actions as "their consequences are allowed to produce legally valid
results").
143. SHAW, supra note 14, at 478 (finding that an extraterritorial abduction is a
violation of international law and that a violation "would only be compounded by
permitting the abducting state to exercise jurisdiction but international practice on the
whole demonstrates otherwise") (emphasis added).
144. BASSIOUNI, supra note 142, at 174-75 (emphasizing that action of the injured
state is required as an avenue of redress in cases of international abduction).
145. See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text (discussing Argoud, Ndhlovu, and
Ker where no complaint was received by the court for consideration and the defendants in
the cases were provided no relief by the respective courts despite their abduction).
146. 68 I.L.R. 7, 7 (S. Afr., Natal Provincial Division 1976).
147. Id. at 9 (stating that "[t]here is some suggestion that the Swaziland authorities
have demanded the return of the applicants, but ... evidence of it is of a hearsay and
inconclusive nature").
148. Id. at 12 (incorrectly referring to Frisbie as "Brisbie, Warden v. Collins" but
correctly citing it as "342 U.S. 519").
149. Re: Argoud, 45 I.L.R. 90, 94 (Ct. of Cass. 1964) (stating that "formal assurance
has been given to-day by the Minist~re public that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has
received no note from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany asking for the
return.., of ex-Colonel Argoud, although he has been detained in France for more than
ten months").
150. See Scott S. Evans, International Kidnapping in a Violent World.- Where the
United States Ought to Draw the Line, 137 MIL. L. REV. 187, 213 (1992); see also Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886) (comparing the Ker holding to a recently decided case,
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principle of male captus bene detentus,5 ' which recognizes a court's
binding authority over a defendant within its jurisdiction despite an
"illegal" method of apprehension.'52 Furthermore, none of the affected
states complained of the sovereignty violation, and there was no
consequence to the states that committed the violations.153
Having laid a foundation for extraterritorial abduction of ordinary
criminals when it suited them in practice, states have also used this
apprehension technique (arguably more justifiably) against individuals
accused of offenses that may be classified under the rubric of crimes
against humanity.'
In these cases, even if the offended state or the
international community protested the sovereignty violation, the protests
were either symbolic in nature, or completely ineffectual in achieving any
meaningful redress.'55
indicating that a protest from Peru, if it had been received, might have resulted in a
successful plea in the Ker appeal); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886)
(identifying the Rauschercase referred to by the court as "considered with" Ker).
151. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 142, at 122 (defining male captus bene detentus as
when courts "assert in personam jurisdiction without inquiring into the means by which
the presence of the accused was secured").
152- See id. at 121-22 (referring to any apprehension outside the framework of
extradition as "rendition"). Bassiouni categorizes these rendition techniques as follows:
(1) abduction and kidnapping of a person by the agents of another state;
(2) informal surrender of a person by the agents of one state to another without
formal or legal process;
(3) the use of immigration laws as a device to directly or indirectly surrender a
person or place a person in a position where he or she can be taken into custody
by the agents of another state.
Id.
153. Cf Jonathan A. Gluck, The Customary International Law of State-Sponsored
InternationalAbduction and United States Courts,44 DUKE L.J. 612, 622 (1994) (discussing
defenses to claims of state responsibility which may exonerate a state). The author asserts
that:
[T]he issue of consent is central to nearly every case of state-sponsored
international abduction. If the asylum state permits a foreign state to exercise its
police powers in the asylum state's terrority, then no issue of state responsibility
arises. State practice suggests that in addition to explicit consent, implicit
consent may be a defense: if a competent asylum state official partakes in the
arrest, even if this arrest is illegal under asylum state law, this involvement is
sufficient to constitute consent and to preclude any assertion of responsibility by
the asylum state.
Id.
154. See generally William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War
Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 767, 779-82 (1999) (discussing the similarity
between traditionally defined war crimes and recently defined crimes against humanity,
and grouping war crimes with other offenses such as terrorism).
155. See supra notes 147-153 and accompanying text (citing Ndhlovu, Argoud, and Ker
in which the respective courts refused to consider redress for the defendants in the
absence of a complaint); see also infra notes 156-171 and accompanying text (referring, for
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The Eichmann incident set the precedent for the practice of
extraterritorial apprehension of war criminals. 56 Although Argentina
officially protested Israel's abduction of Eichmann to both Israel and the
United Nations,'57 the only consequence was the passage of a UN
resolution stating that Israel's action violated Argentinian sovereignty
'
and requesting "reparation." 58
Since the resolution emphasized the
heinous nature of Eichmann's crimes (it also warned of the possibly
destabilizing effects of such sovereignty violations if repeated), the UN
resolution arguably amounted to implied conditional approval of Israel's
action, in spite of its carefully worded language to the contrary. 9 Israel's
"reparation" was in the form of a joint communiqu6l ° with Argentina
that did not negate the fact that Israel retained custody of and had
jurisdiction over Eichmann. 6'
For some time, the Eichmann incident stood virtually alone as an
instance in which the international community in effect approved an
instance of extraterritorial abduction.'62 The emergence of global
terrorism, used as a frightening and destabilizing weapon against a
number of nations by disaffected political groups, created another
seemingly credible exception to the absolute bar to extraterritorial
abduction.'63 The apprehension of such criminals was considered so
example, to Eichmann where the complaint received was responded to with the empty
gesture of a declaration that had no effect on the disposition of the defendant).
156. See Izes, supra note 141, at 16 (characterizing the Eichmann incident as
"reflect[ing] the international law position on state-sanctioned abductions"); see also
GILBERT, supra note 22, at 184 (identifying Eichmann as "[tlhe leading abduction case").
But see Evans, supra note 150, at 200 (asserting that the Eichmann incident simply
demonstrates the concerns raised about international abduction and its legal implications).
157. Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 58 (Isr. Dist. Ct. Jerusalem
1961).
158. S.C. Res. 196, supra note 68.
159. See Izes, supra note 141, at 17 (maintaining that the absence of punitive action by
the UN constituted tacit approval of Israel's actions).
160. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 59. The declaration stated:
The Governments of Argentina and Israel, animated by a desire to give effect to
the resolution of the Security Council of June 23, 1960, in so far as the hope was
expressed that the traditionally friendly relations between the two countries will
be advanced, resolve to regard as closed the incident which arose out of the action
taken by citizens of Israel, which infringed the fundamental rights of the State of
Argentina.
Id. (emphasis added).
161. See Izes, supranote 141, at 17.
162. Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 432 (citing no other international precedent
beyond Eichmann).
163. IAN 0. LESSER ET AL., COUNTERING THE NEW TERRORISM 131 (1999)
(articulating U.S. policy to apprehend terrorists "with or without the cooperation of host
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important that, at times, it required sovereignty violations to ensure
prosecution and prevent continued terrorist acts, because states were
64
often unwilling or unable to prosecute terrorists within their borders.
States usually justified engaging in such apprehensions by asserting the
inherent right of self-defense, as provided in the UN Charter. 65
The United States, for example, asserted that the extraterritorial
apprehensions of alleged terrorists in the Yunis and Kasi cases were
justified under the self-defense rationale.' 66 The U.S. government also
expressed that it will not hesitate to use this method again when
measures such as extradition and diplomacy have failed. 67
Although the crime in Alvarez was of a particularly gruesome and
cruel nature, it did not involve a war crime or terrorist act and seemed to
be a recent reinforcement of the American Ker-Frisbie doctrine which
allows jurisdiction regardless of the method of apprehension.'9
Although strongly criticized by some commentators, 69 the ruling in
Alvarez substantially reinforces Ker-Frisbie,even though the court based
its holding on a very technical reading of the extradition treaty between
Mexico and the United States. 7 Alvarez proved once again that when a

countries"); see also AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, PUB. 10610, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1998, 97 (1999) (listing eight
out of twelve terrorists, including Kasi, as being brought into custody by the United States
through rendition vice extradition between 1993 and 1998).
164. See Izes, supra note 141, at 1 (arguing that abduction may be the only means for
the court to obtain personal jurisdiction). But cf BASSIOUNI, supra note 142, at 176-84
(arguing the premise that extradition is the only "legitimate" method for the state to
obtain custody of a fugitive, but offering only "streamlined" extradition procedures as an
alternative, without discussing how these procedures will compel a state to extradite a
wanted fugitive any more assiduously than the existing requirements).
165. See Evans, supra note 150, at 234-38 (discussing the self-defense doctrine under
Article 51 of the UN Charter).
166. See LESSER, supra note 163, at 1.12-113 (referring to Kasi and Yunis, as well as
other counter-terrorist actions, as requiring "direct response").
167. Id. at 131 (noting "[tihe recent capture in Pakistan of the alleged perpetrator in
the lethal shooting outside CIA headquarters").
168. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (citing Ker in the holding).
169. See generally Michael J. Glennon, State Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on
United States v. Alverez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 753-54 (1992) (condemning the
abduction of Alvarez and the Supreme Court's upholding of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine);
THE SECOND BIENNIAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SEMINAR, THE ALLEGED
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL 119 (Richard D. Atkins ed., 1995) (questioning the Supreme

Court's finding that the failure to mention abduction in the extradition treaty between the
United States and Mexico "amounts to an implicit authorization, [and] is... problematic"
under international law).
170. Alvarez, 504 U.S. at 667, 669-70 (concluding that, since kidnapping was not
specifically addressed in the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, the
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custodial state refuses or is unable to prosecute or extradite such an
individual, some states will choose to commit extraterritorial abduction
in violation of the sovereignty principle to ensure criminal
accountability.17'
V. AN IMPORTANT SHIFT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT REINFORCES
AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIAL
ABDUCTION

In essence, the gradual encroachment of the international law principle
of absolute state sovereignty, the principle that most emphatically
renders extraterritorial apprehension of even the most egregious
criminals illegal, is demonstrated in two ways.' 72 First, it is evidenced by
state practice related specifically to extraterritorial apprehension in the
specific classes of cases discussed above.'73 Second, it is demonstrated by
the codification of human rights standards in international treaties and
the recognition of those standards in international case law.'74
To demonstrate this second premise, it is useful to note the different
rationales for two important holdings of the International Court of
Justice.'75 In 1949, the court emphasized the principle of absolute
sovereignty when it found that Britain had violated Albanian sovereignty
in the Corfu Channel decision.'76 In contrast, in 1969, the court implied
for the first time that human rights violations by a state might legally
justify the international intervention in internal state affairs, regardless of
the lack of state consent. ' This implication signaled an important shift
in international law that deemphasized the principle of absolute

treaty was not relevant to permit relief to Alvarez despite protests by the government of
Mexico).
171. See Izes, supra note 141, 27-28 (discussing Alvarez as representing an instance
when, for certain crimes, the state must resort to state-sponsored abduction in order to
achieve justice). But see SHAW, supra note 14, at 479-80 (delineating a slightly different
approach from the U.S. model, which was used by the United Kingdom in such cases).
172. See supra notes 145-171 and accompanying text.
173. Id. (discussing the widespread absence of sanctions for extraterritorial abductions
in courts in France, Israel, South Africa, and the United States in criminal, war crimes and
terrorist trials).
174. Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16.
175. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); ICJ Advisory Opinion,
supranote 174.
176. (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,36 (Apr. 9).
177. ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 174.
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sovereignty by legitimizing international intervention in internal affairs
for the accomplishment of certain objectives."'
VI. HAS THE UN IN EFFECT ADOPTED THE STATE PRACTICE OF
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPREHENSION FOR WAR CRIMINALS?

The apparent shift in international law as applied to extraterritorial
apprehension began with the UN's treatment of the Eichmann incident,
in which many nations implicitly approved Israel's action of abducting
Eichmann.'79 Application of the Eichmann precedent has taken a
significant turn prompted by recent challenges to the jurisdiction of the
UN's Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia over two Bosnian Serb war
crimes indictees.' ° The challenges were based on alleged extraterritorial
abductions in violation of international law. 8'
Although Stevan Todorovic's plea bargain precluded further judicial
inquiry into his alleged extraterritorial abduction,"" and Dragan Nikolic
has yet to appeal his arrest on the same basis, their cases put the Tribunal
on notice that it needed a legal response to this defense.' 83 Prosecutors at
the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia now find themselves in the
interesting position of "dusting off the Eichmann Precedent" to counter
potential future jurisdictional challenges based on extraterritorial
apprehension. 4

178. See generally ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 174 (finding that South Africa's
imposition of apartheid on the inhabitants of South West Africa was a violation of
customary international law because it violated inherent human rights); Interview with
Morton Sklar, Professor of Law, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law, in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 26, 2000) (acknowledging the importance of the shift in
international law as implied in this case).
179. See Izes, supra note 141, at 17 (elaborating on the weakness of the UN's actions
regarding the case).
180. Jerome Socolovsky, Yugoslav Prosecutors Seek Precedent, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 9, 2000, at http://www.my.aol.com/news /story/html#CYCLE (on file with author)
(describing the planned use of the Eichmann precedent by prosecutors for the Yugoslavia
war crimes tribunal in order to "safeguard the trials of suspects who claim they were
snatched illegally").
181. Id.
182. See Simic, supra note 135.
183. Socolovsky, supra note 180 (stating that "a tribunal legal officer" had prepared a
brief for the judges on Eichmann should it be required).
184. Id. (indicating that the situation may have been raised previously following the
arrest of Bosnian Croat Slavko Dokmanovic, who the tribunal admitted was "lured into an
area of Croatia under U.N. control" prior to his arrest by SFOR).
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Serbia has alleged that both Todorovic and Nikolic were abducted by
NATO agents in Serbia and handed over to SFOR in Bosnia."' NATO
has denied that these men were apprehended in Serbia.' 86 However, if
true, such an apprehension would be a violation of international law
because, if the customary international legal standard is applied, it would
constitute a violation of Serbia's sovereignty. ' Prosecutors at the
Tribunal have stated that regardless of the truth of the matter, the
Eichmann precedent established that illegal apprehension of alleged war
criminals does not vitiate jurisdiction.' 8' In addition, Graham Blewitt,
deputy prosecutor for the Tribunal, publicly stated in August 2000, that
"the international community should not allow Serbia to become a safe
haven for war criminals.""'
In a related development, two Canadians, two Britons, and four Dutch
nationals were arrested in Serbia in July and August of 2000.' 9°
Yugoslavia alleges that these individuals planned to abduct former
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and deliver him to The Hague in
the Netherlands for trial, because of his indictment for war crimes by the
Although the individual
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 9'
93 have denied the
governments,'
defendants,"" as well as their respective
Yugoslavian allegations, at least some of the defendants have close

185. Serb Court Charges Abductors, supra note 123 (describing a Serbian regional
court's accusations charging seven Serbian civilian men with the abduction of war crimes
indictees Stevan Todorovic and Dragan Nikolic in collusion with NATO's SFOR troops).
186. Id. (describing SFOR's claim that Nikolic was initially detained in northern
Bosnia rather than in Serbia).
187. RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 404, note 2.
188. Socolovsky, supra note 180 (stating that "the Eichmann case establish[ed] that
major war criminals are not protected from unlawful arrest").
189. Id.
190. Philippa Fletcher, Arrested Canadians, Britons Taken to Belgrade, REUTERS,
Aug. 11, 2000, available at http://www.my.aol. com/news/story/html#CYCLE (on file with
author).
191. Yann Tessier, Dutch Diplomats May Get Access To Detained Nationals,
REUTERS, Aug. 11, 2000, available at http://www.my.aol.com/news/story/html#CYCLE
(on file with author) (reporting the Yugoslav allegation that the men were plotting to
"catch Milosevic, put him in a ski box on a car and drive him to face international justice
in the West"). But see Daniel Bukumirovic, Belgrade Court Ends Probe into Britons,
Canadians, REUTERS, Aug. 11, 2000, available at http:// www. my. aol. com/ news/ story/
html#CYCLE (on file with author) (reporting that they had been charged with "attempted
terrorism").
192 See Bukumirovic, supra note 191 (stating that the Britons claimed to be working
with the Kosovo police force, while the Canadians claimed they were working for a
construction firm operating in Kosovo).
193. Fletcher, supra note 190 (quoting United Kingdom and Canadian diplomats).
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official ties to the UN and NATO forces, making the proposition at least
theoretically credible.' 9
VII. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TOOLS ARE OFTEN
INADEQUATE TO APPREHEND WAR CRIMES OFFENDERS TO STAND
TRIAL

During the past decade the international community has experimented
with various methods to enforce criminal accountability for individuals
accused of crimes against humanity. 95 In his seminal article discussing
the various enforcement tools used for the Yugoslavia Tribunal,
Professor Michael P. Scharf summarizes potential enforcement measures
for the ICC as: (1) condemnation of state non-cooperation by the UN
General Assembly or the Security Council; (2) monetary rewards for
information leading to indictee apprehension; (3) luring by deception; (4)
freezing indictees' assets; (5) economic incentives for cooperating
governments; (6) diplomatic and economic sanctions; and (7) military
intervention to accomplish apprehension of indictees. ' 9
Each of these measures is an important tool that is sometimes
effectively used, alone or in combination with other tools, to effectuate
apprehension of indictees.'w All too often, however, the inability or
reluctance of both individual nations and the international community as
a whole to use any of these measures results in virtual impunity from

194. Ljubinka Cagorovic, Yugoslav Army Seeks to Charge Britons, Canadians,
REUTERS, Aug. 11, 2000, available at http://www.my.aol.com/news/story/html#CYCLE

(on file with author) (confirming that the British nationals, Adrian Prangnell and John
Yore, were "policemen helping to train a new police force in Kosovo" as part of the UN
peacekeeping effort). But see Philippa Fletcher, Analysis-Arrests of Westerners Dream
Ticket for Milosevic, REUTERS, Aug. 11, 2000, available at http://www.my.aol.com/news/
story/html#CYCLE (on file with author) (discussing the possibility that the charges were
trumped up by Milosevic to consolidate Serbian voters' support in the impending
elections).

195.

AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE

FOR COUNTERTERRORISM,

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,

PUB. 9661, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1987, iii-iv (1988) (delineating the
comprehensive strategy to be followed by the U.S. government to include political and
diplomatic measures, economic sanctions, direct military action, and actions to apprehend,
prosecute, and punish offenders).
196. Scharf, supra note 13, at 927-28 (identifying these measures as "indirect"). But cf
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1987, supra note 195, iii-iv (defining virtually the
same measures).
197. See, e.g., Sanctions-for-trial Deal in Pan Am Bombing Case Now in Libya's
Hands, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 25, 1998, available at http:// www. cjonline.com/ stories/
082598/new.panam.shtml (citing sanctions imposed on Libya as the prime factor in the
surrender of the two Libyan suspects for prosecution).
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prosecution for many of the worst offenders. 9' The ineffectiveness of
current enforcement measures is demonstrated by the continual pleas for
improved apprehension rates by successive chief prosecutors for the
Yugoslavia Tribunal to the international community.9
While the first six enforcement measures listed by Professor Scharf are
the methods initially considered to accomplish apprehension, 2°° the
seventh measure, military intervention, is logically viewed as a last resort.
This is because military intervention is potentially the most expensive
measure, both in terms of the lives and the political risk involved.2 1
Unfortunately, even the traditionally limited viability of military action
has been fatally undermined in recent years. Nations, especially those
that contribute troops to peacekeeping efforts, are now notoriously
reluctant to engage in missions seeking the apprehension of indicted war
criminals79 The United States, the nation generally viewed as most

19& See, e.g., Richard Cohen, Too Timid to Do Justice?,WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2000,
at A35 (deploring the continued freedom of war crimes indictee Radovan Karadzic since
1995).
199. U.N. Prosecutor Frustrated,supra note 12; see also Tom Hundley, A Prosecutor's
Viewpoint, CHI. TRIB., July 19, 1998, at 3.
200. See Scharf, supra note 13, at 944-57 (discussing the shortcomings of the first six
measures). These shortcomings include: (1) Yugoslavia consistently ignoring calls from
the UN, through repeated Security Council resolutions, to cooperate with the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia; (2) identifying the bounty placed on
Slobodan Milosevic by the United States as an example of how an equivalent ICC system
would work, without noting that Milosevic remained at large eighteen months later; (3)
noting that the luring of war criminals, like NATO direct action, has met with only limited
success; (4) relating the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia's use of an
"unexpected legal interpretation" of Article 19 to freeze the assets of individuals, but
relating its ultimate failure when Cyprus refused to cooperate; (5) identifying only limited
success with economic incentives, which were in relation to Croatia, not Serbia; and (6)
the failure of diplomacy to enforce economic sanctions to induce cooperation from the
Yugoslav government. Id.
201. See generally J. Bryan Hehir, NA TO's Laudable Goals and Questionable Means,
WASH. POST, May 16, 1999, at B3 (discussing just war theory and describing the costs
inherent to waging war); see also France Blocks UK Army Plan to Arrest Karadzic,
Telegraph Says, BLOOMBURG NEWS, Aug. 24, 2000, available at http://www.my.aol.com
/news/ story/html#CYCLE (on file with author) (reporting the French military's decision
to veto plans for a British special forces operation to seize Radovan Karadzic in the
French area of operations).
202. See, e.g., Too Timid to do Justice?, supra note 198; see also Scharf, supra note 13,
at 959 (summarizing IFOR's "litany of excuses"). Professor Scharf describes the reasons
for this reluctance as:
(1) arresting war criminals would jeopardize the fragile Bosnian peace;
(2) arresting war criminals could damage NATO's image of impartiality among
Bosnia's factions and invite retaliation against NATO troops;
(3) arresting war criminals would disrupt municipal and federal elections in
Bosnia;
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capable of providing the military resources needed to accomplish this
goal, has assiduously avoided such missions after the failed attempt, in
1993, to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed ended badly
with the deaths of eighteen American soldiers. 3 Other nations prove
reluctant to engage in such missions for a host of political and financial
reasons that are both international and domestic in scope.2
The experience of the Yugoslavia Tribunal proves that nations cannot
be relied upon to consistently extradite their own citizens who are
indicted for crimes against humanity.0 5 Despite the existence of all of the
previously described enforcement measures, many of the most notorious
indictees of the Yugoslavia Tribunal remain at large. 2"'
(4) arresting war criminals is the responsibility of governments in the region, not
international troops;
(5) the NATO forces do not have reliable intelligence information about the
whereabouts of the war criminals; and
(6) NATO troops are not trained to arrest criminal suspects.
Id.
203. Too Timid to do Justice?, supra note 198; see also U.S. Reportedly Drops Secret
Plans to Seize War Crimes Suspect, REUTERS, July 26, 1998, available at http://www.
business-server.com! newsroom/ ntn/ politics/ 072698/ politics7_2813 (reporting the
cancellation of plans by U.S. Special Operations soldiers to seize Karadzic based upon
"French officers who were reluctant to act and U.S. government officials worried about
rekindling Serbian aggression" that could be caused by casualties among the Serbs); see
also Daily Highlights, United Nations Department of Public Information, Bosnia Serb
War Crimes Suspect Commits Suicide DuringArrest Attempt: UN Mission, (Oct. 13, 2000),
available at www.un.orglNews/dh/latest.htm (describing the wounding of four SFOR
personnel when Janko Janjic, a Serb indicted for rape and torture, exploded a grenade
during an arrest attempt). Arrest attempts of war criminals, in what remains a war zone,
can be expected to produce casualties. Id.
204. See, e.g., George F. Will, Milosevic: Not Another Saddam, WASH. POST, Sept. 27,
2000, at A23 (discussing numerous reasons for the United States not to get involved with
Balkan internal affairs); see also News Release, U.S Senator Mike Enzi (R-WY), Enzi
Favors Keeping U.S. Troops Out of Kosovo (Mar. 23, 1999), available at http:/ www.
senate. gov/ member/ wy/ enzi/ general/ prkos.htm (criticizing the Clinton administration's
involvement in Kosovo as symbolic of a "dangerous trend of U.S. intervention all over the
world in conflicts without proper consideration of the strategic value and U.S. security
interests"); US. Should Steer Clear of Yugoslavia, SIERRA SUN, Mar. 25, 1999, available at
http:// www. tahoe. com/ sun/ stories. 3.25.99/ opinion. Opnyugo25Mar7376. html
(recommending that the United States not deploy forces to Yugoslavia based on the
"harsh lesson [learned] during the Somalia debacle").
205. Bosnian Serbs Accused of Aiding War Criminals, BBC NEWS, BBC ONLINE
NETWORK, July 24, 1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.ukhi/english/world/europe/
newsid_138000/138924.stm
(discussing deliberate Serbian efforts to frustrate
apprehensions by NATO through the issuance of false documents to suspected war
criminals).
206. ICTY Press Release, Evidence Hearing Against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic (July 26, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p092-e.htm; see also
Edith M. Lederer, Top Judge Says NATO Should Arrest Top War Crimes Suspects,
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VIII. THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD OUTSOURCE PRIVATE ACTORS IN
ORDER TO APPREHEND WAR CRIMES INDICIEES

The principle of absolute sovereignty is clearly no longer absolute, as
demonstrated by the recognition of human rights standards that
supersede that principle.
State practice encompasses extraterritorial
apprehension under self-defense rationales/°8 The UN and its organs,
and in particular the tribunals, now confront the same difficulties as
states in effectuating the physical apprehension of their most wanted
indictees 2 9 Political considerations have effectively eliminated unilateral
and bilateral extraterritorial apprehension missions by member states. 210
Although it stems from a different legal basis, the American bounty
system suggests a possible solution to the international community's
apprehension problem.
Continuing budgetary considerations at all
levels of government, as well as overcrowding within the prison systems,
makes the bail/bond/bounty system in America an indispensable part of
the criminal pretrial process.2 2 Its effectiveness suggests that an
analogous model, with appropriate additional safeguards to more

ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 1999, available at http://www.clive.canoe.ca/CNEWS
Kosovo9911/09_kosovo.html (quoting the outgoing president of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, charging Yugoslavia's
refusal to "recognize the tribunal's jurisdiction," and NATO's failure of will as the reasons
Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic remain at large). But see Peter Finn, Serb Leaders
Hand Over Milosevic For Trial by War Crimes Tribunal, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at
Al (describing the unprecedented transfer of a head of state, former Yugoslav president
Slobodan Milosevic, to The Hague to stand trial for war crimes charges arising from the
1999 war in Kosovo).
207. Sklar Interview, supra note 178.
208. Compare Evans, supra note 150, at 234-38 (discussing the self-defense doctrine),
with Atkins, supra note 169, at 123 (disputing the argument that either Article 51 or 52 of
the UN Charter supports extraterritorial abduction as a self-defense measure).
209. Hundley, supra note 199; see also Nora Boustany, A Prosecutor in Need of
Criminals, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2000, at A20 (quoting Carla Del Ponte, the chief
prosecutor for the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as declaring: "My
perplexity as a prosecutor is I have too many fugitives").
210. See generally Scharf, supra note 13.
211. See generally Drimmer, supra note 116, at 747-50 (describing the legal basis for
bounty hunting as the breach of a contract between the bondsman and the fugitive).
212. John A. Chamberlin, Note, Bounty Hunters: Can the CriminalJustice System Live
Without Them?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1196-98 (1999) (discussing the positive impact
of bounty hunters in relation to the criminal justice system and estimating that they
account for the apprehension of over 30,000 bail jumpers at no cost to the taxpayers).
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rigorously protect reasonable due process concerns, might be used to

pursue indicted war criminals in carefully limited circumstances. 213
When all other measures to accomplish the apprehension of indictees

such as Radovan Karadzic have failed, the tribunals and the future ICC
need to consider implementing an official, public rewards program for
the apprehension of these indictees by private actors. 14 Such a system
should only be used when the state harboring an indictee within its
borders refuses to extradite or try the indictee itself, as appropriate to
either the primacy of the ad hoc tribunal or the complementarity
principle of the ICC.2"5
Certain safeguards must be carefully built into such a program and
prerequisites must be met before the program can be implemented in an

individual case. First, rules need to be developed to protect the indictee
from unduly harsh or abusive apprehension methods. 216

Second, a

reward should not be offered for a particular individual until an
international arrest warrant has been issued pursuant to an indictment.27
Such a system would provide the equivalent of a grand jury proceeding
that, in itself, offers certain due process protections.

18

IX. CONCLUSION
The international courts that enforce individual criminal
accountability, whether ad hoc or permanent, need a new method to
ensure physical apprehension of persons indicted for crimes pursuant to
the courts' statutes. Such indictees are, by definition, accused of terrible
crimes magnified by the scale on which they are typically committed. To
allow them to remain at large, in the face of such an indictment, seriously
213. Cf Drimmer, supra note 116, at 739 (stating that the government's reluctance to
impose regulations on bounty hunters has led to abuses cureable by treating the bounty
hunters legally as state actors, as well as by implementing a regulatory system).
214. Cf Scharf, supra note 13, at 949-51 (describing the potential effectiveness of a
rewards program for information leading to the apprehension of war crimes indictees).
215. See The Rome Statute, supra note 49.
216. See, e.g., Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 169, U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess. (1979) (delineating rules of conduct for law enforcement officials that
could be used as models for private actors as conditions of receiving the reward offered for
apprehension, thereby guarding indictees' due process rights).
217. Cf Brian T. Hildreth, Commenting, Hunting the Hunters: The United Nations
Unleashes Its Latest Weapon in the Fight Against Fugitive War Crimes Suspects-Rule 61, 6
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 499, at 501-02 (1998) (recommending the use of Rule 61 as
giving the green light to nations supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia to arrest indictees).
218. Id. at 515-16 (discussing the similarity between the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Rule 61
and the American grand jury proceeding).
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undermines the rule of law, as well as the courts' credibility. Using
private actors as an additional apprehension measure, with appropriate
controls and in limited circumstances, is a viable solution.

Catholic University Law Review

